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Abstract 
 
In this article the author proposes that whilst Habermas’s attempt to conceptualise a 
political form oriented towards the institutionalisation of emancipatory practice 
represents a positive step for critical theory, it is best served by developing a theoretical 
framework  that  does  not  presuppose  or  apologise  for  the  instrumental  mastery  of 
external nature. It is argued that in order to achieve such a task, the political potential of 
the critique of instrumental reason elaborated by the first generation of Frankfurt School 
theorists ought to be realised through the labour-mediated reconciliation of humanity 
with both internal and external nature, and for which the libertarian socialism of G.D.H. 
Cole provides an adequate basis. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The most prominent members of the first generation of Frankfurt School critical 
theorists (Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse) have explicitly sought to exclude the 
elaboration of a clearly defined political form from their theoretical frameworks.
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They 
have, instead, limited the task of their social critique to a merely diagnostic one. Critical 
theory,  they argued,  can  only be  expected to  negate the socio-political  institutions 
causing humanity’s domination of itself and external nature. However, with the 
theoretical developments undertaken by Jürgen Habermas, critical theory came to 
develop  into  a  theoretical  exercise  partly  aimed  at  drawing  the  contours  of  the 
democratic processes through which individuals can find the practical means for the 
emancipation of their internal nature from the repressive mechanisms of “advanced 
capitalism.”  One  could  indeed  find  a  significant  concern  with  the  institutional
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arrangement making such a form of emancipation possible as early as The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989). Critical theory, he thought, should not only 
seek to identify the emancipatory potentialities inherent in modernity (communicative 
action), but must also seek to conceptualise the basic institutional framework and the 
various democratic processes through which they can be realised (the public sphere). It 
will nevertheless be shown in this article that, by locating democratic decision-making 
processes  outside  the  sphere  of  material  reproduction,  Habermas  fell  short  of 
elaborating a political form capable of yielding human emancipation. A revisited 
interpretation of Marx’s historical materialist approach will reveal the necessity to re- 
organise the sphere of material reproduction itself. It will then be shown how and why 
the libertarian socialism of G.D.H. Cole provides an adequate basis for achieving the 
latter and realising critical theory’s political potential. 
 
 
 
 
Democracy and the reconciliation of humanity and nature 
 
 
 
Guiding Habermas’s project can be found the notion of control which, as a 
notion deriving from his concerns with moral autonomy, has significantly shaped the 
political content of his critical theory. Key to such a content, in fact, is the view that 
human emancipation is only possible under democratic control. Here is how he briefly 
defined his conception of democracy: 
 
 
We shall understand democracy to mean the institutionally secured forms of general and public 
communication that deal with the practical question of how men [sic] can and want to live under 
the objective conditions of their ever-expanding power of control (Habermas, 1971: 57). 
 
 
Whilst the development of the productive forces increases humanity’s capacity 
for technical control, Habermas contends that it remains an insufficient condition for the 
emancipation  of  humanity  from  repression.  Indeed  as  a  sphere  involving  actions 
oriented towards the efficient mastery of external nature, it is thought to fall short of 
satisfying all human needs. Individuals must also be in a position to make decisions 
regarding the best course of action to follow in order to realise the common good or, as 
Habermas would put it, to answer questions of a pra ctical nature. Alongside such a 
development,  therefore,  must  be  secured  the  institutionalisation  of  communicative
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channels through which the normative concerns related to matters regarding “how men 
can and want to live” are addressed. Furthermore, since the very idea of emancipation 
implies that individuals must be in a position to exert control over decisions on matters 
regarding the common good, decision-making processes ought to assume a democratic 
form. How, then, does Habermas expect the democratic decision-making processes to 
perform their emancipatory function alongside the sphere of material reproduction? 
According to Habermas’s own theoretical framework, the task facing humanity 
once it has reached a particular stage in the development of the productive forces, 
consists in reaching a consensus on “how men can and want to live.” This, in turn, 
entails that individuals must be in a position to make decisions regarding the fate of the 
technological advances achieved through the technical mastery of the forces of external 
nature in the “system.” As such, the problem facing modern societies in their quest for 
complete human emancipation “can […] be stated as one of the relation between 
technology and democracy: how can the power of technical control be brought within 
the range of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens” (Habermas, 1971: 57). A 
society composed of individuals engaging in successful emancipatory practices is one in 
which the democratic decision-making processes have brought technological 
achievements under the rational control of individuals engaging in the various 
communicative practices found in the “lifeworld” and oriented towards “mutual 
understanding.” The aim of this consensus consists in defining, intersubjectively, the 
“right” role for technology in the realisation of the common good. Thus, whilst new 
forms of technologies, such as contraceptive and transportation technologies, constantly 
develop, it is not until individuals voicing their interests through the various 
communicative channels available to them have established the moral significance of 
the role of such technologies, that one can begin to speak of human emancipation. 
Practical  matters  such  as  the  moral  implications  of  the  diffusion  of,  for  example, 
abortive technologies and petrol-guzzling vehicles hold, according to Habermas, no 
place  in  a  sphere  where  actions  are  governed  by  the  “systemic  imperatives”  of 
efficiency and power. The epistemological content of practical questions corresponds, 
instead, to actions oriented towards the accomplishment of a rational consensus on the 
definition of the common good and, as such, strictly regard matters concerning social 
integration or, to put it differently, the emancipation of humanity’s own nature. A 
society failing to accumulate enough socially integrative resources for the development
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of the communicative channels required for democratic decision-making processes 
would, consequently, fail to equip individuals with the means for human emancipation. 
As a social form marking the “colonisation” of the sphere of social integration, 
i.e. the “lifeworld,” by systemic imperatives, the advanced stage of capitalist 
development   effectively   brought   about   a   highly   significant   democratic   deficit 
(Habermas,  1987a;  1988).  Indeed,  once  manipulative  relations  governed  by  the 
principle of efficiency begin to interfere with matters of a practical nature, the latter lose 
their  normative  character,  thereby  causing  a  distortion  in  communication.  As  a 
“solution” to  the problem  of the spread  of instrumental  reason,  Habermas  (1987a) 
proposes to harness the reflexive power of communicative reason by mobilising the 
already existing socially integrative resources and turning them into a buffer against 
systemic imperatives. Individuals are expected to do so by seizing the various 
communicative channels at their disposal. A form of communication undistorted by 
systemic imperatives, itself the precondition for truly democratic decisions, is therefore 
thought to be possible without altering the sphere of system integration, i.e. material 
reproduction.  In  contrast  to  Marcuse,
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then,  Habermas  believes  autonomy  to  be 
 
realisable through democratic decision-making processes standing alongside a 
“technological rationality” yielded by the capitalist model of production. According to 
him it is “a question of setting in motion a politically effective discussion that rationally 
brings the social potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability into a defined 
and controlled relation to our practical knowledge and will” (Habermas, 1971: 61). 
Habermas is here in a position to argue that human emancipation can coexist with 
“technological domination” as a result of his epistemological distinction between 
technical-scientific and practical-normative interests. However, I shall argue that this 
distinction rests on the fallacious assumption according to which the sphere of material 
reproduction is thought to exclude orientations of a normative nature. 
 
 
 
 
On the socially integrative function of labour 
 
 
 
According to Habermas, a central problem with Marx’s social theory is the fact 
that  the  latter  locates  the  “stored  up  forces  of  production”  at  the  centre  of  social 
evolution (Habermas, 1987b: 29). Their development, Habermas argued, ought to be 
interpreted as the key driving force identified by Marx behind the transformation of “the
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world within which subjects relate to their objects” (Habermas, 1987b: 29). This 
interpretation of Marx’s materialism does nevertheless fail to fully appreciate the 
complexity of the dynamics of the socio-economic structure identified by the latter. As 
as one of the most prominent Marxist figures seeking to reveal the embeddedness of 
structures of legitimation in material reproduction put it: 
 
 
it is the primacy of the relations of production over the productive forces that gives to their 
articulation the form of a process of production and reproduction. The productive forces do 
indeed have materiality of their own that can by no means be ignored; but they are always 
organized under given relations of production. Thus, while the two may enter into contradiction 
with each other and undergo forms of uneven development, they always do so within a process 
that stems from the primacy of the relations of production. [emphasis added] (Poulantzas, 1978: 
26). 
 
 
 
Here Poulantzas reveals that the materiality of society, as Marx himself 
understood it, cannot be reduced to the forces of production. In fact, we now discover 
that an accurate understanding of Marx’s materialist stance ought to place a strong 
emphasis  upon  the fundamental  role played  by the organisation  of production,  i.e. 
division of labour, property, law, legitimacy, into a class of owners of the means of 
production imposing its productivist regime onto a class of dispossessed workers, in 
both the development of the productive forces and society at large. After all, it was 
Marx who first raised concerns regarding the direct and causal relation between the 
capitalist division of labour and both the unprecedented pace of development of the 
productive forces  and  the conditions  of existence (exploitation  and  alienation) that 
characterise bourgeois societies. By re-assessing the role played by the organisation of 
production  in  the  development  of  the  productive  forces  and  society  at  large,  one 
becomes capable of fully appreciating the epistemological status of the so-called 
“systemic imperatives” (efficiency and productivity) which, as orientations traced back 
to the emergence of the capitalist division of labour, can no longer be treated as 
components of a knowledge-constitutive interest of a merely technical kind but, rather, 
as ones stemming from the lifeworld. Efficiency and productivity not only inform the 
technical appropriation of the materials of nature, but are also infused with a cultural 
force informing the value-judgements of individuals communicating with each other 
and their internal nature, whilst transforming external nature. The truth content of 
validity claims is therefore assessed according to the normative yardstick framed by the
6  
imperatives of efficiency and productivity, whatever stage within the development of 
capitalism one seeks to address. The political character of what Marcuse (1955) called 
“technological  domination”  cannot,  in  this  sense,  be  explained  in  terms  of  a 
subsumption of a logic of interaction under a formally distinct logic of technical control 
resulting from the supersession of the separation between the state and the economy, but 
must directly be traced back to a sphere of material reproduction organised around the 
division of labour (Stockman, 1978: 31). Thus, since “there is no [value-]neutral notion 
of efficiency and productivity” and, therefore, no value-neutral material reproduction, 
it is possible to argue that Habermas’s distinction between a form of knowledge thought 
to emanate from the transformation of external nature, and another from intersubjective 
relations, cannot be upheld (Eyerman and Shipway, 1981: 563; see also Cannon, 2001: 
126). As such, efficiency and productivity effectively consist of orientations traced back 
to a particular manner of organising social life, i.e. as matters concerning “how men can 
and want to live.” 
Having revealed the necessary political and normative character of technology, 
the task of anticipating decision-making processes that can effectively lead to human 
emancipation becomes one directed at the nature of those practices located within the 
confines of material reproduction. The solution to the democratic deficit facing modern 
societies may consist in bringing technical control under the direct democratic control 
of a  “political  public,”  such as  the form  found  in  Marx’s own  communist  vision. 
However, here is how Habermas responded to such a proposal: 
 
 
[T]he reproduction of social life can be rationally planned as a process of producing use-values; 
society places this process under its technical control. The latter is exercised democratically in 
accordance with the  will and insight of the associated individuals. Here Marx equates the 
practical insight of a political public with successful technical control. Meanwhile we have 
learned that even a well-functioning planning bureaucracy with scientific control of the 
production of goods and services is not a sufficient condition for realizing the associated material 
and intellectual productive forces in the interest of the enjoyment and freedom of an emancipated 
society. For Marx did not reckon with the possible emergence at every level of a discrepancy 
between scientific control of the material conditions of life and a democratic decision-making 
(Habermas, 1971: 58). 
 
 
Habermas’s objections are clear. Since material reproduction and democratic 
 
decision-making   are   two   spheres   of   activity   corresponding   to   two   distinct
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epistemological orientations, the direct control of production by a political public would 
necessarily entail the conflation of practical matters with those of a technical form, “as 
though appropriate means were being organized for the realization of goals that are 
either presupposed without discussion or clarified through communication” (Habermas, 
1971: 58). In other words, the nature of production is such that any attempt to bring it 
under the direct rational control of “associated individuals” will necessarily lead to the 
formation of a society entirely governed by the imperatives of efficiency and 
productivity and, consequently, failing to provide the conditions required for human 
emancipation. According to Habermas, then, the democratic control of industry cannot 
but produce a society in which the communicative energies required for democratic 
decision-making are stifled by the heavily administered, and therefore repressive, 
character of its bureaucratic apparatus. 
His understanding of a democratic control of material reproduction does 
nevertheless overlook the possibility of a relationship between humanity and external 
nature governed by principles of a form different from those currently steering the 
sphere of labour. Marx’s understanding, however, did not. He had in fact envisaged a 
concept of labour reaching beyond the confines of instrumental reason by predicating it 
upon humanity’s recognition of itself as a part of nature (Marx, 2000b) whilst heavily 
criticising “centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, 
bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature” and praising instead “the emancipation of labour” 
through the “self-government of the producers” exemplified by the Paris Commune 
(Marx, 2000c: 584-589). It could therefore be suggested that the prospects of a non- 
instrumental rational control by producers depend upon the recognition of labour as a 
process mediating both the transformation of humanity and nature, and upon the 
corresponding   conceptual   departure   from   the   productivist   model   of   labour 
characterising the capitalist and Soviet mode of production. Thus, whilst it is true that 
Marx failed to “reckon” with the epistemological implications of his concept of labour 
as self-realisation and the institutional framework corresponding to it, segments of his 
works provided the conceptual tools with which the relationship between humanity and 
nature and, consequently, the direct control of industry by producers themselves, could 
be prevented from assuming a rational-instrumental form. 
It was not until the publication of the works of Horkheimer and Adorno that 
epistemological considerations of a non-instrumental relationship between humanity 
and nature,
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potentially reconcilable with the concept of labour as self-realisation found
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in  Marx’s  works,  began  to  gain  ground.  Both  members  of  the  Frankfurt  School, 
however, have made conscious efforts not to venture into the conceptual elaboration of 
the institutional framework corresponding to such a relationship, claiming that any such 
attempts would either be counterproductive or have pernicious effects (Adorno, 1991: 
198-203; Horkheimer, 1975: 234). They were nevertheless in agreement with the view 
according to which matters regarding the transformation of external nature bear a direct 
relevance to the emancipation of humanity’s own nature, and for this reason elaborated 
their critical theory on the more or less implicit assumption that an approach to human 
emancipation from the standpoint of the reconciliation of humanity and nature, in virtue 
of its requiring a creative form of activity mediating the former’s relationship with both 
the internal and external form of the latter, entails an autonomous control of those 
directly involved in such an activity. This is why Horkheimer himself came to suggest 
that the “system of workers’ councils” corresponds to “the theoretical conception which 
[…] will show the new society its way” (Horkheimer, 1982: 104). Thus, although they 
have refrained from exploring the alternative institutional framework, their conception 
of human emancipation – reconciliation of humanity and nature – along with their 
exploration of the epistemological implications of such a conception – aesthetic 
rationality – point towards the introduction of a “politically effective discussion” in and 
about labour. 
Furthermore, if one accepts the view according to which the “revolutionary 
movement negatively r eflects the situation which it is attacking” (Horkheimer, 1982: 99) 
then  one  is  forced  to  accept  the  task  of  contrasting  the  existing  socio-political 
institutions (what is) with an alternative institutional model (what it is not). Also, since 
the aforementioned members of the Frankfurt School all agreed on the repressive 
character of the advanced capitalist bureaucratic apparatus, they must have also shared 
the view that any negative reflection on the situation they are attacking would seek to 
avoid reproducing the conditions leading to such a state of affairs. However, whilst they 
have all traced the origins of instrumental reason back to the instrumental mastery of 
external nature, they shared different views regarding the place such a relationship 
ought to hold in relation to human emancipation. Whereas Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse advocated its total suppression, Habermas insisted that all actions involved in 
the transformation of external nature were necessarily governed by instrumental reason, 
thereby defending its existence alongside human emancipation.  It  was  nevertheless 
shown  above  that  Habermas’s  own  democratic  model  rests  on   a  problematic
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“lifeworld/system” differentiation. One could therefore conclude that any attempt to rid 
society of its repressive character must presuppose the transcendence of “self- 
preservation,” even in the labour process. The autonomous control of industry, which 
the first generation’s conception of human emancipation more or less implicitly calls 
forth, must, in this sense, be stripped of all orientations towards forms of efficiency 
driven by private profit and systematic exploitation. As such, the negative reflection of 
the situation attacked by the first generation of critical theorists, closely corresponds to 
the vision contained in the works of guild socialist G.D.H. Cole: 
 
 
The driving force behind the Guild Socialist movement is a profound belief that man was born 
for freedom – freedom that shall be full and complete. The bureaucrat, on the other hand, looks 
at life from the point of view of “efficiency.” What he desires is that the State shall arrange and 
manage the affairs of its citizens, whether industrial or political, with an eye to extracting the 
most that machine production can achieve. For him life must be organised by those above for the 
benefit of those below. His ideal is a bureaucracy masquerading as a democracy (Cole, 1918: 
25). 
 
 
 
Like the various members of the Frankfurt School – including Habermas – Cole 
opposed the principles underlying the bureaucratic machine to those upon which 
democracy is thought to flourish. Although he is here referring to the heavily 
bureaucratised  state-socialist  alternative to  capitalism,  i.e. to  a specific institutional 
model whereby economic affairs are directly managed by the state, a general opposition 
between orientations towards success and those towards “full and complete freedom” 
can be identified. As such, it could be suggested that his stance at least partly follows 
Habermas’s own,  for both  clearly attacked,  and  for somewhat  similar  reasons,  the 
management of economic affairs by the state. However, instead of dismissing all forms 
of direct control in industry as necessarily repressive, and locating autonomy outside the 
sphere of material reproduction, Cole envisaged an institutional model whereby the 
“democratic principle” applies “not only or mainly to some special sphere of social 
action known as ‘politics,’ but to any and every form of social action, and, in especial, 
to industrial and economic fully as much as to political affairs” (Cole, 1980: 12). 
Contra Habermas, then, and in accordance with the theoretical implications of 
the critical theory of the first generation, Cole believed human emancipation to be 
dependent upon autonomy in labour. Indeed, since the “crowning indictment of 
capitalism,” he argued,  “is that it destroys freedom and individuality in the worker, that
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it reduces man to a machine, and that it treats human beings as means to production 
instead of subordinating production to the well-being of the producer,” one can expect 
such problems to be solved “only by the workers asserting their freedom and proving 
their  individuality,  by  their  refusing  to  be  regarded  as  machines,  and  by  their 
determining to assume the control of their own life and work. [My emphasis]” (Cole, 
1917: 23). In other words, as long as “industrial autocracy remains unchallenged,” 
 
society will fall short of meeting the conditions required for human emancipation (Cole, 
 
1917: 3). By advocating a democratic control of industry, however, Cole is not merely 
defending a change in the nature of the decision-making processes found in the sphere 
of material reproduction, but is also calling forth a radical transformation of the 
relationship  between  humanity  and  nature.  For  the  introduction  of  democracy  in 
industry necessarily entails bidding farewell to instrumental efficiency and productivity. 
In sum, therefore, whereas Habermas called for a “mastery” of the “irrationality of 
domination”  (Habermas,  1971:  61),  Cole  –  as  well  as  the  first  generation  of  the 
Frankfurt School – advocated the latter’s suppression. The next section shall explore 
how Cole envisaged the institutionalisation of democratic decision-making processes 
suitable for reconciliation of matters regarding “how men can and want to live” with the 
actions oriented towards the transformation of external nature. 
 
 
 
 
The associative model and emancipatory practice 
 
 
 
Whilst Cole was keen to expose and overcome the autocratic nature of the 
economic system of capitalist societies, he also made frequent and sustained attacks 
against the form of political organisation such forms of societies entail, namely the 
capitalist state. Indeed, Cole not only presented the existing  “political machine [as] an 
organ of class domination” resulting in a democratic deficit (Cole, 1980: 122), but also 
sought to show how the latter was effectively compounded with the growing that the 
state’s incapacity to deal with the growing complexity of modern societies: 
 
 
Men found themselves called upon to master the art not of governing the State as it was, but of 
prescribing for the government of a vast society which changed its basic structure so fast that the 
magnitude and growing complication of its problems outran hopelessly their capacity to learn the
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difficult art of collective control. Under the leadership of science things ran away with men, and 
the social mind was left groping further and further behind (Cole, 1950: 91). 
 
 
The inadequacy of the modern state machinery, therefore, cannot be explained 
merely in terms of interests and class domination. One must indeed turn to the 
institutional structure of the political system supporting capitalist societies in order to 
grasp fully the causes of their democratic deficit. Cole, then, sought to warn us against 
the growing incapacity of the modern state to provide an outlet for “collective control.” 
The mode of representation at the basis of the state, namely “representative democracy,” 
has failed, he argued, to realise its emancipatory promises. Instead, and in virtue of the 
limited control it has been capable of yielding, “representative democracy” has created a 
state of affairs where individuals “feel lonely in a great crowd unless there is someone 
to hustle them into herd activity,” thereby making them vulnerable to the influence or 
control of “the man with the loudest voice, or […] the loudest loud-speaker and the 
most efficient propagandist technique” (Cole, 1950: 99). With an institutional structure 
and mode of representation incapable of accommodating the direct control required for 
“a  society  in  which  everyone  has  a  chance  to  count  as  an  individual,  and  to  do 
something that is distinctively his own” (Cole, 1950: 99) Cole is eventually forced to 
dismiss the “omnicompetent State, with its omnicompetent Parliament, [as] utterly 
unsuitable to any really democratic community” (Cole, 1980: 32). For this reason, they 
“must be destroyed or painlessly extinguished” (Cole, 1980: 32). It could already be 
suggested here, then, that in addition to the affinity Wyatt (2006) identified between 
Marx’s own political orientations in The Civil War in France and Cole’s work, the 
latter’s libertarian socialism could also be said to constitute a political solution to the 
problems identified by the Frankfurt School’s thinkers with regards to the various socio- 
political institutions flourishing under the advanced stage of capitalist development 
(Schecter, 2005; 2006). 
What form, then, would an institutional structure and mode of representation 
suitable for a truly democratic society assume? If, according to Cole, a central problem 
with the existing political machine is, in virtue of its “hugeness” and distance from the 
day-to-day affairs of individuals, its incapacity to give adequate recognition to the 
particular and ever-changing needs of these same individuals, it must follow that the 
latter “can control great affairs only by acting together in the control of small affairs, 
and finding, through the experience of neighbourhood, men whom they can entrust with
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larger decisions than they can take rationally for themselves” (Cole, 1950: 94-5). For 
this reason, the institutional structure of the political sphere must be re-organised into 
“groups   small   enough   to   express   the   spirit   of   neighbourhood   and   personal 
acquaintance” (Cole, 1950: 94-5). In other words, according to Cole, the problems 
identified with the existing political life would best be overcome by re-organising it into 
various associations, whose local character would serve to maximise each member’s 
control over the “larger decisions” requiring representation. 
Above and beyond the local nature of associations, it is their very raison d’être 
that is instrumental to a key criterion when discussing democracy, namely the 
maximisation of communication. Since, as Cole further pointed out, the “consciousness 
of a want requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction is the basis of association” 
(Cole, 1920: 34) the latter effectively serves the direct purpose of giving its members “a 
chance to count as an individual, and to do something that is distinctively his own” in 
cooperation with others. Members of each association are, in this sense, united by a 
common purpose originating from the “translat[ion] of their consciousness of wants into 
will” (Cole, 1920: 33). Any political representation expected to maximise direct control 
over decision-making processes must, accordingly, be organised around the purpose of 
each association. However, whilst a re-organisation of the political machine’s 
institutional structure and mode of representation constitutes a necessary step towards 
the  formation  of  a  truly  democratic  society,  it  remains,  as  has  already  been 
demonstrated, an insufficient one. As Cole argued: 
 
 
[…] Society ought to be so organised as to afford the greatest possible opportunity for individual 
and collective self-expression to all its members, and […] this involves and implies the extension 
of positive self-government through all its parts [My emphasis] (Cole, 1980: 13). 
 
 
Cole, then, effectively sought to give life to liberal ideas of autonomy (the 
possible) without reproducing conditions of existence causing “individual self- 
expression” to develop into self-preservation (the actual). In order to achieve such a 
task, he argued, the sphere of material reproduction itself cannot be excluded from a re- 
organisation of its institutional structure into associations. The task, here, as Cole 
suggested, is to “reintroduce into industry the communal spirit” required for the creation 
of conditions favourable for “self-expression,” and therefore direct control (Cole, 1980: 
46). With the market forces under the control of individuals organised into associations,
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and a mode of political representation aimed at defending the interests of the various 
members in each association, one can begin to catch a glimpse of the contours of an 
institutional  framework  capable  of  giving  human  emancipation  in  all  the  relevant 
aspects of social life its due.  It  could therefore be argued that Cole’s  institutional 
framework realises the political potential of critical theory in such a way as to provide a 
basis  upon  which  the  fossé  between  the  actual  and  the  possible,  which  the  first 
generation of the Frankfurt School insisted on revealing, can be overcome. 
One is nevertheless justified in asking, here, how Cole expected the political 
sphere to relate to its economic counterpart? Or, to put it differently, how did Cole 
envisage the various associations to interact with one another in such a way as to form a 
coherent whole? In order to provide an answer, one ought to turn to the purpose of 
associations. As was discovered above, the members of each association are united by a 
common purpose which constitutes the purpose of the association itself. According to 
Cole, “[e]very such purpose or groups of purposes is the basis of the function of the 
association which has been called into being for its fulfilment” (Cole, 1920: 49). Thus, 
in virtue of its seeking to realise a specific purpose, every association is said to perform 
a particular function. The latter, which Cole also described as “the underlying principle 
of social organisation” shall therefore serve as a basis for the political representation of 
the interests of the various individuals organised into economic and civic associations 
(Cole, 1920:  48).  Cole summed  up  the  advantages  of  the principle of function  as 
follows: 
 
 
Due performance by each association of its  social function […] not only leads to smooth 
working and coherence in social organisation, but also removes the removable social hindrances 
to the “good life” of the individual. In short, function is the key not only to “social,” but also to 
communal and personal well-being (Cole, 1920: 62). 
 
 
With an institutional framework composed of political, economic and civic 
associations, the principle of efficiency underpinning the various institutions composing 
advanced capitalist societies and causing the spread of the “social hindrances” to the 
“good life,”4  would be substituted with the principle of function whose general impact 
on the various domains of social life shall consist in providing a cohesive basis upon 
which “the creative, scientific and artistic impulses  which capitalism suppresses or 
perverts” can flourish, “and to enable the now stifled civic spirit to work wonders in the
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regeneration of human taste and appreciation of the good things in life” (Cole, 1980: 
 
115-6). Above all, then, and in virtue of their localised, cooperative and functional 
character, associations provide individuals with the organisational means to gain control 
over the various political, economic and civic processes currently in the hands of the 
state and the market, whilst ensuring that the self-realisation ensuing therefrom assumes 
a socially cohesive character. 
In  order to  grasp the full  range of mechanisms  making the aforementioned 
alignment possible, one ought to turn to one of Cole’s main inspirations, namely 
Rousseau’s social and political thought. What attracted Cole to Rousseau was above all 
the latter’s concern with the riddle of the relationship between individual interests and 
the common good, which the French thinker claimed to have solved in his concept of 
the “general will.” Despite the now well-known problems associated with this famous 
concept,
5 
it was the fact that “it put right at the heart of social thought the notion of will, 
 
rather than so passive a notion of ‘consent’ or so objectionable a notion as obedience of 
the subject to the commands of a superior” that led Cole to develop such an admiration 
for Rousseau (Cole, 1950: 113-4). It was, as Cole himself put it, a “special kind of will” 
for the following reasons: 
 
 
He [Rousseau] was insisting that men, whenever they form or connect themselves with any form 
of association for any active purpose, develop in relation to the association an attitude which 
looks to the general benefit of the association rather than their own individual benefit. This is not 
to say that they cease to think of their own individual advantage – only that there is, in their 
associative actions, an element, which may be stronger or weaker, of seeking the advantage of 
the whole association, or of all its members, as distinct from the element which seeks only 
personal advantage (Cole, 1950: 114). 
 
 
Cole, therefore, was not effectively seeking to establish whether Rousseau has 
successfully solved the aforementioned riddle but was merely interested in the manner 
in which the latter sought to solve it. He discovered that by placing his emphasis on the 
notion of will in associative actions, Rousseau had been able to expose the mechanisms 
whereby one actively seeks to realise the purpose of the association (or common good). 
The development of this “attitude which looks to the general benefit of the association 
rather than their own individual benefit” could only be possible wherever individuals 
become conscious of the fact that the satisfaction of a want requires involvement in 
cooperative  action  for,  under  such  conditions  the  association,  although  effectively
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embodying a will of a different kind to the will of each individual, turns the common 
good into an extension of the good life of each individual. An institutional framework 
making it possible for individuals to act in accordance with their will would, in this 
sense, create the conditions for the development of social solidarity into a sentiment 
and, ultimately, turn the common good (or purpose of each association) into a project 
which the members of associations could all actively and personally commit to. As 
such, social solidarity is said to be experienced as a “strong impulsion” (Cole, 1950: 
128) or “primitive social impulse that has been overlaid by bad institutions, but not 
destroyed” (Cole, 1950: 129), and whose release would be made possible by the re- 
organisation of economic and political life into associations. 
It should now become clearer how and why the associative model elaborated by 
Cole could provide solutions to the problems identified by the members of the Frankfurt 
School. It could be argued that in order to create the conditions favourable for human 
emancipation as the reconciliation of humanity with both external nature and itself, the 
institutional framework must be engineered in such a way as to strip material 
reproduction and political life of instrumental reason and allow “sentiment” to become 
“a force in the shaping of human affairs,” or, to use Habermas’s own terms, a force 
shaping decisions regarding “how men can and want to live” (Cole, 1950: 128). It is 
with  this  particular concern in  mind  that  Cole sought  to  actualise the  good  life  – 
composed of both practical and technical orientations – in his associative model, an 
actualisation that, according to him, cannot be limited to a re-organisation of the sphere 
of production, but should also be extended to consumption as well. The next section 
shall both present his reasons for arguing so and further demonstrate how Cole’s 
libertarian socialism effectively serves the realisation of critical theory’s political 
potential. 
 
 
 
 
Production, Consumption and Dialogue 
 
 
 
Conceptualisations of alternative societal models aimed at overcoming the 
problems associated with the capitalist mode of production have, as a result of the 
predominance of orthodox Marxist perspectives, favoured and even prioritised the 
democratic control of production by workers. As Marx himself had discovered, private 
property and the wage-system that ensued therefrom have turned the act of labour, and
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therefore the labourer himself, into a means for the accumulation of capital, thereby 
causing the subservience of the vast majority of individuals composing society to the 
economic system. Human emancipation, it was thought, could only be expected to 
flourish  on  a  societal  scale once  the sphere  of  material  reproduction  has  been  re- 
organised in such a way as to rid the system of production of its alienating, exploitative, 
and generally oppressive character.
6 
This is precisely why, in The Civil War in France, 
 
one can find Marx defending the “self-government of the producers” exemplified by the 
Paris  Commune,  but  also  the  reason  why conceptualisations  of  alternative  societal 
models inspired by Marx’s works have placed such a strong emphasis on the radical re- 
organisation of the system of production. 
However, whilst such visions of a truly emancipated society include detailed 
analyses of the relation between individuals and labour, they have tended to neglect the 
role of consumption in self-realisation, and to theorise it as a dimension of internal 
nature. Indeed, whereas, for example, Marx himself was conscious of the inhuman 
character of the general process (production and consumption) of the satisfaction of 
needs,
7   
he  did  not  seek  to  present  the  sphere  of  consumption  as  one  capable  of 
 
developing its own repressive mechanisms, and therefore as one necessitating a distinct 
analytical emphasis. He therefore did not ask himself whether the individual would 
indeed succeed in finding the means for emancipation in consumption, for he believed it 
was sufficient to demonstrate that a failure to achieve self-realisation through labour 
would necessarily prevent society at large from acquiring the means to attain human 
emancipation. It could nevertheless be argued that by locating the crux of his critique of 
political  economy in  production,  Marx  effectively failed  to  anticipate  the key role 
consumption would eventually come to play in the advanced stage of capitalist 
development.  Indeed,  not  only  has  the  latter  sphere,  as  Habermas  (1974)  argued, 
become central to the production of value, it has also, as the first generation of critical 
theorists demonstrated, come to perform a key function in repression. 
When one engages with the works of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, one 
cannot but appreciate the significance and complexity of the repressive mechanisms 
found in the sphere of consumption embodying a system such as the “culture industry.”. 
Under an age of “mass culture,” they argued, one ought to expose the conditions under 
which individuals “as producers and consumers” experience the principle of self- 
preservation brought about by the capitalist mode of production (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997: 120). Under the pressure of a hostile and competitive environment
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yielding conditions of existence under which individuals can only be expected to 
“cope[…] most proficiently with the facts” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 83), 
individuals as producers are forced to abandon any hope for self-realisation in labour, 
and ultimately seek refuge in a sphere where they expect to find the pleasure and 
comfort denied in production by what the first generation of critical theorists referred to 
as “self-preservation” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997). The latter, therefore, is said to 
engender a “longing for a ‘feeling on safe grounds’” which, combined with the search 
for pleasure, turns individuals as consumers into agents immediately responsive even to 
the most superficial and incomplete of instinctual releases (Adorno, 1991: 161). They 
are, for this reason, most responsive to a system – such as the culture industry – relying 
precisely on those “psycho-dynamic” mechanisms making possible the effortless and 
non-reflexive experience of pleasure, i.e. a form of pleasure that is not experienced as a 
process of self-realisation involving both sensuous and cognitive faculties, i.e. a form of 
satisfaction that does not really satisfy. However, since such a system, by professing the 
attainment of pleasure whilst thriving on the feeling of insecurity generated by self- 
preservation and complying with the logic of efficient capital accumulation, effectively 
limits the experience of the consumers of culture to one of “adjustment and unreflecting 
obedience” (Adorno. 1991: 163), it ultimately falls short of fulfilling its very own 
promises: 
 
 
The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The 
promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; 
the promise, which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is illusory: all it actually confirms is 
that the real point will never be reached, that the diner must be satisfied with the menu (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 1997: 139). 
 
 
By restricting the consumers’ experience to the domains of “fun” and 
“entertainment,” the films, music and other cultural artefacts supplied by the culture 
industry become incapable of supplying the cultural forms making it possible for 
individuals to engage in sustained self-gratification, also known as the sublimation of 
instincts. Instead, the culture industry tends “to ensnare the consumer as completely as 
possible and in order to engage him psycho-dynamically in the service of pre-meditated 
effects” (Adorno, 1991: 166). Consequently:
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The man with leisure has to accept what the culture manufacturers offer him. Kant’s formalism 
still  expected  a  contribution  from  the  individual,  who  was  thought  to  relate  the  varied 
experiences of the senses to fundamental concepts; but industry robs the individual of this 
function. Its prime service to the customer is to do the schematizing for him. Kant said that there 
was a secret mechanism in the soul which prepared directly intuitions in such a way that they 
could be fitted into the system of pure reason. But today that secret has been deciphered. While 
the mechanism is to all appearances planned by those who serve up the data of experience, that 
is, by the culture industry, it is in fact forced upon the latter by the power of society, which 
remains irrational, however we may try to rationalize it; and this inescapable force is processed 
by commercial agencies so that they give an artificial impression of being in command. There is 
nothing left  for  the  consumer to  command. Producers have  done  it  for  him  (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997: 125). 
 
 
Under the control of psycho-dynamic mechanisms aimed at attracting as wide an 
audience as possible, drawing their manipulative force from the divorce between reason 
and the senses,
8  
and addressing themselves mainly to the latter, individuals effectively 
lose control over the release of their instinctual energies. However, since the 
“desublimation”  of  instinctual  energies  resulting  therefrom  means  that  individuals 
remain in a position to experience instant forms of gratification, the latter fail to call 
into  question  the  hostile  and  manipulative environment  surrounding them.  In  sum, 
therefore, whilst the pleasure the culture industry constantly promises in advertising 
campaigns and marketing strategies must under such circumstances remain an illusion, 
the control sought by individuals over the choices made in the sphere of consumption 
becomes no less illusory. Under the advanced stage of capitalist development, then, 
individuals fail to emancipate themselves not only as producers but also as consumers. 
Once the central function played in repression by the psycho-dynamic 
mechanisms found in the sphere of consumption
9 
has been exposed, it becomes the task 
of the critical theorist to explore the conditions under which such a sphere, along with 
material reproduction, can serve the realisation of the good life where each person 
develops  their  own  vision  that  is  no  longer  interpreted  in  terms  of  functional 
competence or success in capital accumulation. As such, any attempt to conceptualise 
an alternative institutional model aimed at creating the conditions favourable for 
emancipation must be directed at the two spheres. It is with such concerns in mind that 
Cole elaborated his associative model:
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[T]he only way in which industry can be organised in the interests of the whole community is by 
a system in which the right of the producer to control production and that of the consumer to 
control consumption are recognised and established [My emphasis] (Cole, 1917: 281). 
 
 
Whilst Cole was conscious of the fact that because the worker “does not find his 
job interesting or pleasurable [he] seeks his pleasure outside it, in his hours of leisure” 
(Cole, 1957: 16) he was clearly aware of the fact that “the decision of the character and 
use of the product is clearly a matter primarily for the user” and cannot therefore 
“remain in the hands of outsiders” such as market forces or, more concretely, the 
“commercial agencies” (Cole, 1917: 106-7). Thus, democratic control must be exercised 
in both production and consumption. 
Cole’s concern with consumption could, at this point, be said to reveal a 
significant affinity and complementarity between his libertarian socialist institutional 
framework and the critical theory of the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School. 
Indeed, whilst Adorno and Horkheimer merely sought to reveal the mechanisms at work 
in  the  repression  of  individuals  qua   consumers,  Cole  provided  the  theoretical 
foundations upon which the emancipation of these individuals from repression could be 
conceptualised and translated into practice As such it could be suggested that, to put it 
in terms echoing the views of Frankfurt School thinkers, Cole effectively treated 
consumption as a central dimension to the ema ncipation of internal nature from the 
psycho-dynamic mechanisms causing individuals to experience repressive forms of 
desublimation. Such a concern for consumption, then, marks a significant departure 
from  previous  attempts  to  institutionalise  emancipatory  practice.  By  restricting  the 
scope of its concerns to the conditions of existence experienced by individuals qua 
workers, the Marxist orthodoxy had locked itself into a somewhat narrowly defined and 
pernicious vision of a society where the invisible hand of the free market would be 
substituted with the all-too-visible and autocratic rule of planners, whose role would 
consist in the highly challenging task of satisfying the needs of society at large. Under 
such an institutional framework, individuals qua consumers would lose all control over 
the definition of their needs, thereby failing to find the conditions of existence required 
for autonomous self-realisation. The conceptual elaboration of an alternative vision 
aimed  at  turning  human  emancipation  into  a  reality  must,  therefore,  also  give 
recognition to the role played by consumption in the realisation of the good life. Indeed, 
as Cole put it, “[i]f the good life is a blend of satisfactions achieved from consumption
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and satisfactions achieved from successful creation, the only answer […] is that men 
themselves must decide collectively what blending of these elements they like best” 
(Cole, 1950: 97). One can further appreciate the relevance of such a sphere to self- 
realisation once the changing nature of the capitalist mode of production is accounted 
for. Indeed, as has been demonstrated above, individuals have, as a result of the 
alienating nature of the wage-system and the division of labour, turned to the sphere of 
consumption for self-realisation. Thus, a reorganisation of consumption into democratic 
associations would not only give the role of consumption in self-realisation its due, it 
would also serve to overcome the more recent  and increasingly complex forms of 
repression
10  
found at the advanced stage of capitalist development, thereby allowing 
 
individuals  qua  consumers  to  exert  control  over  the  definition  of  their  needs  and 
opening up an horizon of possibilities for the sensuous objectivity of nature to be 
expressed in the definition of those needs. 
One is nevertheless justified in asking, at this point, how individuals organised 
into such associations would come to harmonise their individual plans of action. In 
other words, whilst it may seem immediately clear why one individual can best be 
emancipated in an association, it remains difficult to grasp how human emancipation 
could be achieved cohesively on a societal scale. In order to answer such a question, one 
must first turn to the very raison d’être of an association. If, as Cole suggested, one 
enters into an association following the consciousness of a “want requiring co-operative 
action for its satisfaction,” one can immediately appreciate the continuity between the 
good life of the individual members and the good of the association as a whole. The 
purpose  of  each  association,  therefore,  is  pursued  by  its  members  as  their  own. 
However, in order to ensure the completion of the process of satisfaction of needs, the 
producers must be in a position to know the quantity and quality of goods and services 
to be supplied, and the consumers in a position to communicate their needs. With such a 
concern in mind, Cole envisaged the introduction of a dialogue between the various 
associations. Once associations of producers enter into a dialogue with the associations 
of consumers, the members of the respective associations would be in a position to 
defend the interest of the association as their own and “negotiate on equal terms” (Cole, 
1917: 86). Dialogue would, as a result, turn the satisfaction of needs into a process 
 
capable of maximising “the freedom of the producer as well as the consumer” (Cole, 
 
1917: 302). With the invisible hand of the free market replaced by a dialogical 
relationship  between  a  supply  side  and  a  demand  side  organised  into  democratic
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associations of producers and consumers respectively, one thus gains an insight into the 
institutional framework in which the process of satisfaction of needs is directly shaped 
by decisions regarding “how men can and want to live.” 
 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
The various members of the first generation of critical theorists, on the whole, 
agreed with each other regarding the dependence of the emancipation of internal nature 
upon the process whereby external nature is transformed. They have nevertheless fallen 
short of providing an insight into the institutional structure within which the set of 
social relations required for human emancipation could develop. As such, Habermas’s 
attempt to address the institutionalisation of the reconciliation of humanity and nature 
and to treat it as a matter strictly regarding the relationship between humanity and itself 
marks a significant departure from the earlier generation. However, by locating 
democratic decision-making processes outside the sphere of material reproduction, and 
rejecting both the desirability and possibility of an alternative relationship between 
humanity and external nature, he fell short of elaborating a political form potentially 
capable of providing individuals with the practical means for the democratic expression 
“how they can and want to live.” What I have therefore sought to achieve in this article 
is to realise the political potential of critical theory by reconciling the prescriptive 
character of Habermas’s own theoretical orientations with the approach to human 
emancipation as the reconciliation of humanity with both internal and external nature 
defended by the first generation of critical theorists.  In order to do so, I have attempted 
to expose the elective affinity between the associative model of democracy elaborated 
by  G.D.H.  Cole  and  the  form  of  emancipatory  practice  defended  by  Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Marcuse, whilst revealing that the self-government of individuals 
consists in, as Marx himself put it, “the political form […] under which to work out the 
economic emancipation of labour” (Marx, 2000c: 589). 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes
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1 
Marcuse  and Fromm did somehow anticipate alternative conditions of existence : the 
aesthetic form for the former (Marcuse, 1969),  and a system where the individual 
actively “participates in the social process” in such a way as to make the “active and 
spontaneous realization of the self”  possible, for the latter (Fromm, 2002: 237). 
 
2    
In  One-dimensional  Man  (1955),  Marcuse  revealed  the  political  character  of 
“technological rationality,” and called for a “ new” technology. 
 
3 
The reconciliation of humanity and nature such a relationship entails is, as Held put it, 
“implied” in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Held, 1980: 157). 
 
4  
Such “social hindrances” include phenomena such as competition, alienation, the 
division of labour, class inequalities, bureaucracy, the wage-system etc. 
 
5  
Habermas himself has charged Rousseau for failing to solve the above riddle: “Even 
Rousseau’s democratic conversion of the sovereignty of the prince into that of the 
people did not solve the dilemma. Public opinion was in principle opposed to 
arbitrariness  and  subject  to  the  laws  immanent  in  a  public  composed  of  critically 
debating persons in such a way that the property of being the supreme will, superior to 
all laws, which is to say sovereignty, could strictly speaking not be attributed to it at all” 
(Habermas, 1989: 82). 
 
6  
Such a stance can be found in conceptualisations ranging from the state socialism of 
Lenin to the anarcho-communism of Mikhail Bakunin. 
 
7  
Marx did indeed argue that as a result of the inhuman character of production, the 
consumer is prevented from experiencing the “enjoyment or use of [the producer’s] 
product [as] the direct enjoyment of realising that [the producer] had both satisfied a 
human need by [his] work and also objectified the human essence and therefore 
fashioned for another human being the object that met his need” (Marx, 2000d: 132). 
 
8 
It is on this separation that the psycho-dynamic mechanisms rely, for it allows them to 
stimulate a reason-free, and therefore unrestrained, release of instinctual energies. 
Instinctual energies are here therefore said to be desublimated. 
 
9  
It must be noted here that whereas the earlier generation of critical theorists were 
particularly concerned  with  one dimension  of consumption,  namely culture,  Cole’s 
works addressed the phenomenon of consumption as a whole. What is of particular 
interest here, however, is way they all sought to depart from the restricted emphasis on 
production found in conventional Marxist critiques, and approach human emancipation 
(and the various mechanisms hindering it) as a phenomenon also concerning 
consumption. 
 
10  
The contemporary relevance of these forms of repression was shown by Steinert in 
his work entitled Culture Industry (2003). In it, Steinert provides several contemporary 
examples, such as the Princess Diana phenomenon or Woody Allen films, arguing that 
they are but a few clear illustrations of  “the insulting diet of trash that seduces us with a 
false promise of pleasure that is never realized.” (Steinert, 2003: 5).
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